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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY RAY RICHARDS, 
DELORES R. MERKLEY, and 
GORDON A. RICHARDS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
VERNON RICHARDS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondents join in the Issues Presented for Review statement 
made by Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Respondents join in Appellant's statement of the Nature 
of the Case. 
B. Disposition of the Case Below. 
Respondents join in Appellantfs statement of Disposition 
of the Case Below. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
Respondents agree generally with the outline of facts 
set forth in the brief of Appellant as to Statement of Facts. 
However, Appellant does not accurately set forth the posture 
of the case before the Trial Court and this supplemental Statement 
of Facts is therefore necessary. 
Case No. 860536 
Priority 
Category No. 13b 
The Pleadings 
Respondents1 complaint against Appellant sets forth a 
cause of action against Appellant on the theory that the Appellant 
has held in trust assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards in 
which each of the Respondents have an interest and that Appellant 
was therefore a trustee for Respondents and owed a fiduciary 
duty to them in the handling of the assets of the estate of 
Lloyd Richards. 
The prayer of the complaint requested the Trial Court 
to require Appellant to account to Respondents for his handling 
of assets in which they had an interest. The prayer requested 
the Trial Court to determine sums due from Appellant to Respondents 
which/ it was Respondents' allegations/ Appellant had wrongfully/ 
willfully/ and without just cause withheld from Respondents. 
Jurisdiction in the Trial Court was claimed by Respondents 
under Sections 75-7-201/ Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 75-7-203/ 
Utah Code Annotated 1953/ fixes venue in the county where the 
trust has its principal place of administration. Respondents 
also believe that Section 75-7-205 creates jurisdiction in the 
Third Judicial District Court/ Appellant's place of residence. 
Appellant removed the assets in which Respondents claim an interest 
from Uintah County to Salt Lake County. 
Appellant was named as the executor of both the Bertha 
Richards estate and the Lloyd Richards estate in the wills that 
had not been offered to probate. 
Section 75-3-203 grants priority to the Appellant to be 
appointed personal representative. Priority continues only 
for 45 days. Bertha V. Richards died on July 21, 1983. Lloyd 
Richards died on September 26, 1983. Respondents1 complaint 
was filed in Salt Lake County on the 24th of June, 1985, 23 
months after Berthafs death, 20 months after Lloyd Richards1 
death. 
On the 15th of March, 1986, Appellant in the above-entitled 
action filed an affidavit in this matter, to which affidavit 
he attached wills of both Lloyd Richards and Bertha Richards, 
neither of which had been filed for probate by him even though 
he was named as executor in both wills. (See Affidavit of Vernon 
Richards, R. 52). 
Both wills provided for equal distribution of the estates 
among the Respondents and Appellant after the death of Bertha 
and Lloyd Richards. 
Estate of Bertha Richards 
The family, including Lloyd Richards, met at the home 
of Lloyd and Bertha Richards after Bertha's death. All parties 
to this action were present. At the family conference, it was 
discovered that Bertha Richards had decided to make a different 
distribution of her estate and distribute a gift of $1,000.00 
to each of her grandchildren and great-grandchildren. She had 
discussed this distribution with Respondent Merkley. Exhibit 
2 is a breakdown showing the distribution of her estate considering 
the fact that there were different grandchildren and great-grandchildre 
to be taken into account. She had obtained during her lifetime 
certificates of deposit in the name of each of her four children 
in the sum of $20,000.00. Applying her formula of making a 
$1,000.00 gift to each of her grandchildren and great-grandchildren, 
an unequal distribution then would occur between the Appellant 
and the three Respondents1 families. Appellant had only two 
children and no grandchildren. Shirley Richards, Respondent, 
had 5 children and 11 great-grandchildren. Delores Merkley, 
Respondent, had 5 grandchildren and 10 great-grandchildren. 
Laddie (or Gordon) Richards, Respondent, had 6 grandchildren 
and 13 great-grandchildren. On the bottom of Exhibit 2, the 
unequal distribution is spelled out. The distribution resulted 
in the Appellant's family receiving from the estate of Bertha 
Richards $22,000.00, Shirley Richards's family $36,000.00, Delores 
Merkley's family $35,000.00, and Laddie Richards's family $39,000.00c 
Bertha's planned distribution is the chief complaint that Appellant 
makes as far as the estates are concerned. 
At the family conference, father Lloyd Richards objected 
to the distribution as set forth in the proposal of Bertha Richards. 
His objections were that loans charged against Vernon Richard's 
share of Bertha's estate shown on Exhibit 2 to be $9,577.26, 
and loans charged against Delores Merkley's share of $5,000.00 
were not proper since loans to other Respondents were being 
forgiven and not shown on Exhibit 2. Lloyd Richards indicated 
that if these loans were charged against Vernon and Delores, 
he would make it up to them by giving them additional gifts 
in his estate (R. ). 
Members of the family then agreed that they would not 
deduct the loans from Vernon's share of Bertha's estate nor from 
Delores Merkley's share of Bertha's estate. 
Following the family conference/ adjustments of the agreed 
distribution of Bertha Richards' estate were made. The adjustment 
required Gordon (Laddie) Richards/ a Respondent/ and Shirley 
Richards/ a Respondent/ to pay a part of the sums distributed 
to them to Appellant Vernon Richards and to Respondent Delores 
Merkley. 
Exhibit 1 shows that the adjustment required Shirley Richards 
to return $4,234.28 and Laddie Richards to return $3,622.66. 
These two items were then distributed as follows: Vernon 
Richards, Appellant, received $6,987.57 and Delores Merkley 
received $869.41. 
Appellant denies that he agreed to this settlement of the 
estate of Bertha Richards. However, he does not deny receiving 
from Shirley Richards a check for $4,234.28 on or about August 20, 
1983 and cashing said check which has on its face a legend 
"balance of inheritance" (Exhibit 6). Nor does he deny receiving 
from Laddie (Gordon) Richards a check for $2,757.00 dated 
August 24, 1983. These two checks total $6,981.28, $3.71 more 
than the amount shown to be due to Vernon on Exhibit 1 received 
by the Court. Exhibit 7 shows that Laddie (Gordon) Richards 
paid Delores Merkley $870.00, which would be 59C more than the 
amount shown to be due her on Exhibit 1. 
The family also divided up personal property that was in 
the home following Bertha's death and prior to Lloyd's death. 
Each of the parties/ including the Appellant/ took the personal 
property that was allocated to them by the family conference. 
Lloyd Richards died just a month after the distributions were 
completed and the checks delivered to Appellant and Respondent 
Delores Merkley. 
Respondent Delores Merkley helped her mother in dividing 
up her estate and making the allocations to take care of the 
fact that she wished to make a gi£t of $1/000,00 to each of 
her grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Evidence on this 
fact is undisputed and documented. 
It is the Respondents1 position that the estate of Bertha 
Richards was distributed without probate and that all of the 
parties to this action accepted and ratified the distribution 
prior to the death of Lloyd Richards and prior to the filing 
of the complaint in this action on June 24, 1985. (Tr. Pg 2) 
Estate of Lloyd Richards 
After the death of Lloyd Richards on September 26/ 1983/ 
Appellant gathered up all of the papers and documents and items 
in the safe at the home of Lloyd Richards, took a motor home 
titled to Lloyd Richards, and removed those assets to Salt Lake 
City. A list of items removed is Exhibit C attached to the 
deposition of Vernon Richards which is in his wife's handwriting. 
(Pg 13, Deposition of Vernon Richards) 
Prior to the death of Lloyd Richards, Vernon had obtained 
an Assignment of Contract on sale of real property executed 
by Lloyd Richards and Bertha Richards. This is the Williams 
contract. 
The escrow agent for Lloyd Richards and Bertha Richards, 
First Security Bank of Vernal, then paid to Vernon Richards 
the balance owing on the contract as they received it. Vernon 
Richards also gathered out of bank accounts on which his name 
was a co-signator with his father Lloyd Richards monies that 
were on deposit at the time of the death of Lloyd Richards. 
The amount received on the Williams contract was $19,442.91, 
amounts withdrawn from checking accounts at Zions First National 
and First Security Bank was $10,874.09, or a total of $30,317.00. 
This information was supplied by Appellant (Ex. 33). Appellant 
purchased three $10,000.00 savings certificates at Valley Bank 
& Trust Company. Exhibits 15, 16 and 17 are photostats of those 
savings certificates numbered 102767, 102759 and 102758. The 
savings certificates were purchased in July, 1984. Each bears 
a legend as to ownership. Exhibit 15 shows ownership to be 
"Vernon L. Richards for the estate of Lloyd and Bertha Richards". 
Exhibit 16 shows Vernon L. Richards "(estate of Lloyd and Bertha 
Richards)". Exhibit 17 shows Vernon L. Richards "(estate of 
Lloyd and Bertha Richards)". 
Out of the cash received in these transactions, Vernon 
Richards paid the burial expense for Lloyd Richards. 
Vernon Richards had, prior to his father's death, obtained 
the title to the motor home. It was endorsed in blank by his 
father. The motor home itself remained in Vernal in the possession 
of Lloyd Richards until his death. Vernon Richards sold the 
motor home for $9,000.00. 
The home at Vernal of Lloyd Richards was deeded to Shirley 
Ray Richards, Vernon L. Richards, Delores Merkley, and Gordon 
Andrew Richards on August 5/ 1983/ each to have an undivided 
one-fourth interest (Ex. D7 attached to the depositions of the 
parties). 
The evidence demonstrated that during the lifetime of 
Bertha and Lloyd Richards, they on many occasions had loaned 
money to their children. The items on the accounting/ Exhibit 
2 shows two of such loans/ one to Vernon Richards/ Appellant/ 
of $9,577.26, and one to Delores Merkley of $5,000.00. These 
loans, in the settlement of Bertha's estate, were effectively 
forgiven by parties to this action. It is the testimony that 
Lloyd Richards said, "all loans are forgiven" (R.243 ). The 
family conference arrived at the agreement that Vernon's $9,577.26 
should not be deducted from his share and that Delores's $5,000.00 
should not be deducted from her share. This workout is shown 
on Ex. 1. 
The Pleadings 
An examination of the Complaint by Respondents and the 
Answer and Counterclaim by Appellant will reveal that Respondents 
alleged that Vernon Richards was in possession of assets owned 
by the estate of Lloyd Richards and held said assets as trustee 
for the four children of Lloyd Richards. The Answer and Counterclaim 
of Appellant, paragraph 4, admitted that Appellant had picked 
up the papers, documents and assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards 
and exercised control over said assets. A specific denial in 
paragraph 4 was that he exercised control over assets in the 
hands of the Respondents. Paragraph 4 admits that the assets 
of the estate of Lloyd Richards belong equally to Appellant 
and Respondents. Respondents actually avers that all of the 
assets of Lloyd Richards belong in equal shares to Respondents 
and Appellant. 
Paragraph 6 of the Answer and Counterclaim of Appellant 
admits that he has possession of personal property belonging 
to the estate of Lloyd Richards. Paragraph 8 admits that Appellant 
has received payments owed to the estate of Lloyd Richards. 
Paragraph 10 of the Answer and Counterclaim has a direct assertion 
by Appellant that Respondents are each entitled to a one-fourth 
undivided interest in all assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards/ 
including assets that are in the hands of Appellant. 
There is in Appellant's Answer and Counterclaim a Third 
Defense/ a Fourth Defense/ a Fifth Defense/ a Sixth Defense/ 
and a Seventh Defense/ but at no point in the Answer does the 
Appellant claim to be the sole owner of the assets that were 
in the estate of Lloyd Richards. 
The Counterclaim of the Appellant sets forth a claim based 
only on the distribution of the assets of the estate of Bertha 
Richards. The Second Claim for Relief in that Counterclaim 
sets forth claims against the Respondents for loans made by 
Lloyd Richards during his lifetime and for distribution of assets 
of the estate of Lloyd Richards by Respondents. In the Counterclaim 
Appellant makes no mention of any claim that he has on the assets 
by reason of being a joint tenant or makes no claim that said 
assets were a gift by Lloyd Richards to Appellant. 
The first claim made by Vernon Richards/ Appellant/ that he 
was intended to be a joint tenant and take the assets held in his 
name and his father's name as joint tenants without recognizing 
interests of the other children is on the last day of trial after 
Judge Dee had indicated that a surviving joint tenant could make 
such a claim (Tr. p. 505-507). 
Assets of the Estate of Lloyd Richards 
The assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards at the time of 
trial consisted of three money market certificates of $10/000.00 
each/ Exhibits 15, 16 and 17. All three were bought by Appellant 
in July of 1984 and represent the proceeds from the bank account 
of Lloyd Richards and the payments made on the contract between 
Lloyd and Bertha Richards and Williams. Each certificate identifies 
the certificate as related to the estate of Lloyd and Bertha 
Richards. 
An asset also of the estate of Lloyd Richards was an automobile 
which was sold by Respondent Laddie (Gordon) Richards. The proceeds 
from said automobile were divied one-fourth to each of the 
Respondents and Appellant. It is apparent that the title to this 
automobile was signed in blank by Lloyd Richards during his 
lifetime. The motorhome that Appellant now makes claim to was 
in the possession of Lloyd Richards at the time of his death. 
Title to it was in blank and signed by Lloyd Richards. Appellant 
notarized his fatherfs signature and filled in his own name 
as transferee (R . p. 467). Additional assets of the estate of 
Lloyd Richards are 2-3/4 shares of Central Irrigation Company 
stock and 31 shares of Steinaker water in the Central Canal 
Company. It is undisputed that these assets are assets of the 
estate of Lloyd Richards and should be divided equally among the 
four children. 
An additional bank account was discovered in which Respondent 
Delores Merkley was named as a joint tenant with Bertha V. Richards. 
Respondent Merkley acknowledged that this bank account was the 
asset of the estate and should be divided equally among the four 
parties to this action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE IN THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT WAS PROPER. 
POINT II: THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED 
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
POINT III: JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DISTRIBUTES THE 
ASSETS OF BERTHA AND LLOYD RICHARDS AS 
THEY INTENDED. 
POINT IV: THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE AND 
APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE CLEAR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE IN THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT WAS PROPER. 
Appellant, after trial was scheduled, moved the trial 
court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint, or, in the alternative, 
stay the proceedings so that probate could be started in Uintah 
County. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on the 24th of June, 1985, 
trial was set for the 8th of April, 1986, the motion by Appellant 
to dismiss/ or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings was filed 
on the 14th of March, 1986, ten months after suit was begun. 
These motions were considered by the court and denied. 
Respondents1 Complaint is based on a theory that Appellant 
had in his possession assets which he held in trust for them and 
over which he had absolute control and for which he had not made 
any accounting nor distribution. Appellant acknowledged to the 
last day of trial that Respondents were entitled to an equal share 
of the assets with himself, but would not implement his 
acknowledgment by action. 
It was the position of the Respondents that as to the 
estate of Bertha Richards, the estate had been completely 
distributed and that no probate of her will was necessary. There 
was a will providing for equal distribution among the four parties 
to this action. It nominated Appellant to be the personal 
representative. However, this priority continued only for 45 days 
after the date of death. (See Sec. 75-3-203, UCA 1953). 
Respondents argue that the failure on the part of Appellant 
to commence probate of the Bertha V. Richards will is evidence 
of two things: (1) that he knew the estate had been fully and 
completely distributed, (2) that the distribution made of Bertha's 
estate was satisfactory to him as well as to all of the other 
heirs. 
The Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Stay 
Proceedings filed just 22 days before trial was scheduled and 
two years and approximately eight months after the death of 
Bertha Richards has little substance to support Appellant's 
claim that he was not satisfied with the distribution made by 
the family members of the assets of Bertha V. Richards. 
Section 75-3-101/ UCA 1953/ provides that the assets of 
an estate devolve to the heirs of the deceased person upon death 
whether probate is commenced or not. All of the parties who were 
interested in the distribution of the assets of Bertha V. Richards 
were before the court. It could dispose of every conceivable 
contention or claim. 
Section 75-3-102/ UCA 1953/ provides specifically that a 
will/ though not admitted to probate/ may be admitted as evidence 
of a devise. Bertha V. Richards1 will was considered by the 
trial court. Accomplishing her intentions as shown by her will 
and the other documents presented was the end the trial court 
achieved. 
The editorial comment in Section 75-3-102 provides insight 
into the legislature's intentions. It states as follows 
concerning provisions of the section: 
"Rather they are designed to make the probate 
requirements inapplicable where circumstances led 
survivors of the decedent to believe that there 
was no point to probating a will of which they 
have had knowledge." 
The comment is applicable to the circumstances surrounding the 
family of Bertha V. Richards. It is undisputed they agreed on 
a distribution and all parties took their shares without a 
serious controversy. 
Appellant at trial stated that he did not agree to this 
settlement of the Bertha Richards estate. He admitted that he 
took his share of the .personal roperty/ that he accepted the 
checks from Shirley Ray Richards and Gordon A. Richards necessary 
to implement the family settlement agreed on in August of 1983 
(See Ex. 6-7)/ and cashed the distribution checks without comment. 
The real dispute that Vernon Richards/ Appellant/ has 
with the distribution of the Bertha V. Richards estate is not 
with the Respondents but with Bertha. The decision made by the 
trial court resolved the issue in favor of Bertha's clear, 
undisputed expressions of what she desired to occur with her 
worldly goods. 
Bertha wanted her children/ grandchildren/ and great-
grandchildren to receive a token of her affection and provided 
for a $1/000.00 gift to each of the grandchildren and great-
grandchildren prior to her death (R. p.243/ Ex. 2). 
When these sums are paid out/ the family of the Respondents 
considered as a whole receive a substantially larger amount of 
money than the family of Appellant. Gifts to Bertha's children 
are equal/ but family gifts would then be unequal (Ex. 2). 
Up to the time of trial/ Respondents believed this dispute 
over Bertha's estate was the only thing that kept the parties 
from settling not only the Bertha V. Richards estate but the 
Lloyd Richards estate. 
Appellant changed his position during trial and now insists 
that he is entitled to a larger portion of the Lloyd Richards 
estate by reason of the joint tenancy and assignment of the 
Williams contract. 
The same sections of the Probate Code apply to the 
handling of the Lloyd Richards estate as are set forth and 
applicable to the Bertha Richards estate. There was a will 
nominating Appellant as the executor of the estate of Lloyd 
Richards. Lloyd died on September 26, 1983. The will was not 
filed for probate prior to commencement of this action on 
June 24, 1985, two years and nine months after death. The Lloyd 
Richards estate provides for equal distribution among the 
Respondents and Appellant. Conduct of the parties again 
demonstrates that they did not believe it was necessary under 
the state of assets to probate Lloyd Richards1 estate. Vernon 
Richards acknowledged the interest of the Respondents in the 
assets of Lloyd Richards and that he acted as their fiduciary 
(see pleadings). 
Section 75-7-202, UCA 1953, governs trusts. It provides 
that a trustee submits personally to jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state when he accepts the trust. It is the position of 
the Respondents that Appellant has accepted a trust in the state 
of Utah and has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the state by such conduct. Section 75-7-202(3) provides 
that unless otherwise designated i nthe trust instrument, the 
principal place of administration of a trust is the trustee's 
usual place of business where the records pertaining to the 
trust are kept, or at the trustee's residence. 
It is undisputed that Appellant removed the property in 
which Respondents have an interest from Uintah County to Salt Lake 
County. it is undisputed that Appellsant resides in Salt Lake 
County. It seems obvious that not only jurisdiction but venue 
is proper in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County* 
POINT II. THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED 
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
The findings of fact by the court are supported by clear 
and convincing evidence and in most instances by undisputed 
evidence. The following items are undisputed: 
1. The wills of Bertha V. Richards and Lloyd Richards 
provided for equal distribution among their children of their 
estates. 
2. Both wills named Appellant asexecutor. Neither will 
was ever filed for probate by Appellant or Respondents prior to 
the commencement of this action on the 24th of June, 1985. 
3. The family, following the death of Bertha V. Richards 
and while Lloyd Richards was alive/ held a family conference and 
settled the estate of Bertha V. Richards. Settlement required 
two of Respondents to contribute from their shares as specified 
by Bertha to the share of Appellant and the other Respondent. 
Distribution included many items of personal poroperty which were 
segregated and taken by all of the parties. Appellant and 
Respondent Merkley accepted checks from Respondents Shirley Ray 
Richards and Gordon A. Richards for the amounts calculated to be 
necessary to settle their shares in Bertha V. Richards1 estate. 
4. Appellant took into his possession all of the papers 
and the motorhome which were in the possession of Lloyd Richards 
prior to his death following his death on September 26/ 1983. 
5. Appellant acknowledged that the assets in his 
possession were assets of the estate of Bertha and Vernon Richards, 
but failed to make any accounting or distribution of the assets 
between the 26th of September, 1983 and the commencement of the 
legal action before the court on the 24th of June, 1985. 
6. Lloyd Richards, during his lifetime, signed in blank 
titles to his motorhome, to his family automobile, and executed 
an assignment of a contract between himself and Bertha Rcihards, 
as sellers, and Robert H. Williams, as buyer, to Appellant. 
7. Appellant has received all payments from the escrow 
agent, First Security Bank, and invested said funds, together 
with other funds received by him from the First Security Bank of 
Vernal and Zions First National Bank, in savings certificates 
bearing the following legends: 
Exhibit 17: Savings certificate No. 102758 in the 
amount of $10,000.00 dated July 18, 1984, 
Valley Bank & Trust Company, bearing 
legend "Vernon L. Richards (estate of Lloyd 
and Bertha Richards)". 
Exhibit 16: Savings certificate No. 102759 in the 
amount of $10,000.00, dated July 18, 1984, 
Valley Bank & Trust Company, bearing legend 
"Vernon L. Richards (estate of Bertha and 
Lloyd Richards)". 
Exhibit 15: Savings certificate No. 102767 in the 
amount of $10,000.00 dated July 23, 1984, 
Valley Bank & Trust Company, bearing legend 
"Vernon L. Richards for the estate of 
Lloyd and Bertha Richards". 
8. The monies used to purchase the savings certificates 
came from the following resources of Lloyd Richards: $19,442.91 
from Williams contract, $2,942.41 from the First Security Bank of 
Utah, Vernal Branch, Account No. 123000012-062-11926-16, and 
$7,931.68 from the bank account of Vernon Richards at Zions First 
National Bank, Vernal Branch, Account No. 26-31432-8, a total of 
$30, 317.00. The balance left over of $317.00 was held in a bank 
account by Appellant. 
9. The home of Lloyd and Bertha Richards described as 
all of Lot 4, Meadow Park Subdivision, Vernal, Uintah County, Utah, 
was deeded by Lloyd Richards during his lifetime to the Respondents 
and Appellant in equal shares. 
10. A 1982 Chrysler automobile owned by Lloyd Richards was 
sold following the death of Richards by Respondent Gordon A. 
Richards and the proceeds distributed one-fourth to each Respondent 
and one-fourth to Appellant. Title to said vehicle was endorsed 
in blank by Lloyd richards prior to his death. 
11. A bank account at First Security Bank, No. 62-813-9128, 
with a balance of $2,669.14 in the joint names of Bertha Richards 
and Delores Merkley, Delores Merkley acknowledges is to be shared 
equally by the Respondents and Appellant. 
12. In the contract of sale by Lloyd Richards and Bertha 
Richards to Robert H. Williams, the water rights on the property 
sold and the mineral rights were reserved by Lloyd and Bertha 
Richards. The water rights consist of 2-3/4 shares of Central 
Irrigation Company stock and 31 shares of Steinaker wter in the 
Central Canal Company, Certificates No. 683 and 3729. All parties 
acknowledge that they are entitled to a one-fourth interest in 
these properties. 
13. Lloyd Richards during his lifetime deeded by warranty 
deed to Shirley Ray Richards, his son, a piece of real property 
containing 3.8 acres located in Vernal, Utah. 
14. The Respondents and Appellant, in distributions made 
of personal items both following the death of Bertha Richards and 
following the death of Lloyd Richards, attempted to distribute 
the personal effects equally between Respondents and Appellant. 
15. It is uncontroverted that the following testimony 
describes what happened following Bertha!s death: 
"A We talked — mostly dad kind of give us 
instructions of what he expected and all. And at 
that time he said tht all debts were to be forgiven 
up to that time, his and mother's both. Then — then 
he said he would give us the savings certificates that 
mother had had made out to each one of us and we could 
all go to the bank and cash those in. And I think it 
was the next day after that that we done that. 
Q Did he then, at that meeting, distribute savings 
certificates? 
A No, not at that meeting. He waited until we 
were all ready to go to the bank. 
Q Then what happened? 
A He give us the certificates, and we all went down 
to the — well we went to Zions Bank first and cashed 
those certificates that were there to be cashed, and 
then went across the road to First Security and cashed 
those over there. 
Q Now, in that distribution, Mr. Richards, was the 
Money Market Certificates and the balance in your 
checking account included? 
A Yes. Her checking account, she had pretty well 
bought these certificates with, and I think she kept 
a little bit in there for — for her burial purposes 
and stuff." (Tr. p. 243) 
The court's findings are thus supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
POINT III. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DISTRIBUTES THE 
ASSETS OF BERTHA AND LLOYD RICHARDS 
AS THEY INTENDED. 
Court found that it was the intentions of Bertha Richards 
and Lloyd Richards/ set forth in both wills/ to divide their 
estates equally among their children. Court then found that 
during the lifetime of Bertha Richards and Lloyd Richards/ 
distributions were made which did not result in equal distribution 
to their children (see Paragraph 21 of Findings/ R. p. 211). 
It found that the distributions consummated during the lifetime 
of Lloyd and Bertha Richards were in accordance with their wishes 
and desires. 
Court found that the items listed in the Findings of Fact/ 
paragraph 6, (a) the mobile home/ (b) real estate contract balance 
from Robert H. Williams/ (c) bank accounts in First Security 
Bank of Utah/ Vernal Branch/ (d) bank account at Zions First 
National Bank/ Vernal Branch/ (e) water rights in Central 
Irrigation Company and Steinaker water in the Central Canal 
Company/ (f) mineral rights on land sold to Robert H. Williams/ 
were not distributed during the lifetime of Lloyd Richards and 
Bertha Richards. That it was the intentions of Lloyd and Bertha 
Richards that their children share equally in those items. 
Court found that the consummated gifts and distributions 
made by both deceased parents were demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence and that no fraud/ misrepresentations or 
undue influence was practiced on either of the deceased parents. 
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Court found that since the death of Bertha and Lloyd 
Richards, the heirs have, through their repeated transactions, 
demonstrated and acknowledged awareness of the intention of 
their parents as found by the court. Court then found that 
the assets in the possession of Appellant as listed in paragraph 6, 
those items listed specifically herein, have been held by Appellant 
as a trustee for himself and the other heirs of Lloyd and Bertha 
Richards and that the duty of fidelity arises and has existed 
since their death. That accountings by Appellant as trustee of 
the earnings are reequired as a result of the fiduciary 
relationship. 
Court refused to award attorney!s fees to parties. 
The judgment of the court then provides that each of 
the parties are to share one-fourth interest in the mobile home, 
the proceeds from the real estate contract with Williams, the 
bank accounts at First Security Bank of Utah and Zions First 
National Bank, the water rights, the mineral rights, the bank 
account in which Delores Merkley is a joint owner with Bertha 
Richards. Judgment further ordered the parties to cooperate 
in selling the home at Vernal, Utah and ordered that the proceeds 
be divided one-fourth to each of Respondents and Appellant. 
Judgment recognized the distribution to Shirley Ray Richards of 
the 3.8 acres of land as one free of any claims of the other 
children. It adjudged that each of the parties was the owner 
free and clear of any other party to the other items distributed 
prior to the death of Lloyd Richards or subsequent thereto, to 
which distributions there have been no objections made. 
Judgment determined that as to the items of property in 
the possession of Appellant and Respondent Delores R. Merkley, 
that said parties are trustees, the benefit of the Respondents 
and Appellant. 
Judgment orders the trustees to liquidate said properties 
and distribute equally among the beneficiaries the items listed 
within a reasonable time following entry of the judgment. It 
orders a coooperation among the members of the family in selling 
the family home at Vernal. Appellant was retained as trustee, 
but a provision was made that if he physically was unable to 
handle the work of liquidating the assets, then the Respondent 
Gordon A. Richards would be appointed successor trustee. 
Court made a specific judgment that tehre were no known 
creditors of Bertha or Lloyd Richards and that the heirs of 
Bertha and Lloyd are Respondents and Appellant. 
The findings, conclusions and judgment are supported by 
clear and convincing evidence, much of which is undisputed. 
POINT IV. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE AND 
APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE CLEAR. 
A. The Probate Code, Section 75-1-102(2), UCA 1953, clearly 
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states the basic considerations applied by the trial court. 
It reads: 
2. "The underlying purposes and policies of this code 
are: (b) to discover and make effective the intent of 
a decedent in distribution of his property". 
If there can be any question about this principle being 
applicable, the common law background has established the rule 
for the past thousand years, which is "the cardinal rule in the 
construction of wills and codicils is that the intention of the 
testator must be ascertained if possible and if it is not in 
contravention of some established rule of law or public policy, 
must be given effect." 95 CJS Section 590, p. 731, Hundreds 
of cases are cited to support the principle which Respondents 
believe is uncontrovertible. 
B. Appellant was the son and nominated personal 
representative of both parents and a confidential relationship 
existed be'tween them and him. The transfers and transactions 
between the deceased parents and Appellant show no consideration 
running from Appellant to the parent. 
This court has set down the principle applicable clearly 
in the case of Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (1978). Language 
of the case is as follows: 
"Whether litigants were in confidential relationship 
at the time of the transactions about which they 
litigate is ordinarily a question of fact and is not 
to be found on the basis of mere friendship or social 
or religious affiliation between the parties. There 
are a few relationships (such as parent-child, 
attorney-client, trustee-destui) which the law presumes 
to be confidential." 
With a confidential relationship existing/ this court 
has ruled that the transaction which benefits one in whom 
confidence is placed creates a presumption that the transction 
is unfair and shifts the burden of proving that it was a fair 
transaction from the Respondents to Appellant. In Cunningham v. 
Cunningham/ 690 P.2d 549 (1984), the court recites the principle 
applicable here in the following language: 
"When a confidential relationship exists between 
parties/ and a transaction occurs that benefits the 
one in whom confidence is placed/ a presumption 
arises that the transaction is unfair. E.g./ 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen/ 16 Utah 2d 378, 383, 401 P.2d 
710, 713 (1965). This shifts to the benefiting party 
the burden to persuade the court that there was no 
fraud or undue influence exercised toward the other. 
In re Swan's Estate/ 4 Utah 2d 277, 293,293 P.2d 682, 
693 (1956). From the findings of the trial court/ 
which are amply supported by the evidence/ the burden 
was properly shiftted to defendants/ and they wholly 
failed to carry it. The fact that they were in 
1
 somewhat good faith1 is not enough to free them from 
the consewquences of their actions. The deed should 
have been voided. Seequist v. Seequist/ 524 P.2d 598 
(Utah 1974); Albright v. Medoff/ 54 Or. App. 143, 
634, P.2d 479 (1981)." 
A subsequent holding by this court restates the principle 
relied on by Respondents. It is Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 
(1985). The court sets down the principle in the following 
language: 
"However, if a confidential relationship is found to 
exist between parties, any transaction that benefits 
the party in whom trust is reposed is presumed to have 
been unfair and to have resulted from undue influence 
and fraud. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d at 383, 
401 P.2d at 713; Cunningham v. Cunningham, Utah, 
690 P.2d 549, 553 (1984); The benefiting party then 
bears the burden of persuading the fact finder by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction 
was in fact fair and not the result of fraud or undue 
influence. if that burden is not carried, the 
transaction will be set aside. In re Swan's Estate, 
4 Utah 2d 277, 293, 293 P.2d 682,693 (1956); 
Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 43-44, 337 P.2d 
420, 422 (1959); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 
at 383, 401 P.2d at 713; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 
690 P.2d at 553." 
The conduct of the parties, the conduct of the decedents, 
provide adequate basis for the courtfs determination that clear 
and convincing evidence supported the finding that Appellant was 
to act as fiduciary in the handling of the property in the Lloyd 
Richards estate for the benefit of himself and his brothers and 
The closest case on the basic facts that Respondents have 
been able to find is Culley v., Culley, 404 P.2d 657, 17 Utah 2d 
62 (1965). There this court announced in a similar situation 
its opinion as follows: 
"On the basis of claimant's own testimony, it seems 
incontestable that the trial court could reasonably 
find as it did, that neither he or his father 
intended that he should have any interest in this 
bank account while his father lived. As in other 
matters of proof, whether the evidence is sufficient 
to meet the necessary rewquirements of being clear 
and convincing, is largely for the trial court to 
determine because of its advantaged position. 
Under the traditional rules of review, which require 
us to survey the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings, we can see 
no basis for reversing the judgment." 
It is respectfully submitted thsat the evidence is clear 
and convincing that Lloyd Richards intended that his estate 
should be divided equally among his children, that the children 
understood this to be his intention, and their conduct following 
his death demonstrates such understanding. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1987. 
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Respondents 
